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Religion Still Matters 
Brooks B. Hull I 
ABSTRACT. Research by Lipford, McCormick, and Tollison and by Hull and Bold shows 
a negative relationship between church membership and crime rates. The results are 
important but do not employ the most recent available data. This paper reproduces Hull 
and Bold's results using more contemporary 1990 data by United States county. This 
paper also compares 1980 and 1990 county data. Results are consistent with the earlier 
research. County crime rates are significantly negatively related to county church 
membership share. Other factors affecting county crime rates include unemployment, 
poverty, expenditures on police, population density, and income. (K42, L39, ZOO) 
I. Introduction 
The economics literature does not lack for explanations for crime. 
Factors asserted to influence crime include those closely related to costs 
and benefits of crime like unemployment, wages, welfare payments, 
expenditures on police, probability of arrest, probability of conviction, 
and severity of sentence, examples being work by Andreoni (1995), 
Cover and Thistle (1988), Doyle, Ahmed, and Hom (1999), Ehrlich 
(1975), Ehrlich and Brower (1987), Layson (1985), Lott (1990), and 
Zhang (1997). Other researchers emphasize demographic factors like 
income, race, age, gender, education, and population density (Fox, 1978; 
Usher, 1997). Still other explanations include crime being caused "by 
males not properly fathered" (Eberly, 1996) or as a result of what 
amounts to herd behavior (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1996). 
Religion's impact is curiously neglected in the literature on crime. 
Apparently only three scholarly papers address the issue, and the earliest 
of these does so almost as an afterthought. In an examination of U.S. 
time series data, Layson (1985) finds, but barely acknowledges, a 
significant inverse relationship between church men1bership and capital 
crime. More recently, Lipford, McCormick, and Tollison (1993) find a 
significant inverse relationship between total church membership by U.S. 
state and various forms of social misbehavior. Hull and Bold (1995) 
obtain similar results using U.S. county data on churcl1 membership and 
various crime rates. 
One explanation for the lack of attention to religion may be a 
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perceived lack of relevant data. Yet the Glenmary Research Center 
publishes estimates of church membership by denomination by U.S. 
county and county-level criminal data are readily available. Another 
possible explanation is that researchers believe the United States to be a 
secular country or that religious belief is declining in the United States. 
Neither notion is accurate. Church membership increased after the 
Revolution to about 60% (one ofthe highest levels in western countries) 
in 1950 and has remained relatively constant since (Finke and Stark, 
1992, p. 16). Other measures of religious commitment also have 
remained high and constant in the last several decades. 
On the other hand, there are good reasons to include religion in our 
analysis ofcrime. The economic literature on crime, pioneered by Becker 
(1968, 1976), focuses on individuals who respond predictably to the costs 
and benefits ofconlmitting crime. Religions doctrine includes provisions 
that increase the cost of crime. All major United States religions have 
rules against and punishment for committing crime. The Judeo-Christian 
religions have rules including the Ten Commandments, which prohibit 
murder and theft, for example. Islam, being what Hodgson (1974) 
describes as an "Abrahamic" religion, has similar prohibitions. The 
Koran even refers to the Ten Comnlandments (Koran, 7: 144-149, "The 
Heights, AI-A'Taf'). Both Islam and Judaism have extensive bodies of 
criminal and civil law and interpretation. Religious temporal punishment 
in the United States mainly consists of social pressure and the threat of 
ostracism. Religions also punish crime in the afterlife. This form of 
punishment can be extreme indeed, including eternal damnation. 
Religious rules arguably have affected human behavior throughout 
history, and may have contributed to economic growth in some regions. 
Weber (1958) argues, for example, that the behavior standards 
promulgated by Protestant denominations encouraged economic growth 
in Europe at the end ofthe medieval period. Those who dispute this view 
either argue that Catholic Church doctrine encouraged growth as well 
(Ekelund, et aI., 1996) or that the separation of church and state 
encouraged growth (Kaufman, 1997). Note especially that even Weber's 
critics argue that religion played an important role in European 
economies before and during the Reformation. In a cross-cultural 
analysis, Hull and Bold (1994) examine circumstances where religion is 
relatively important in encouraging appropriate individual behavior. 
Closer to home, Heath, Waters, and Watson (1995) argue that religious 
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doctrine influences per capita personal income by state in the United 
States. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that religion and crime are 
significantly negatively related, a result consistent with the limited earlier 
research incorporating religion but ignored by most researchers on crime. 
II. Regressions Using 1980 and 1990 Data 
Crime rates can be thought ofas the result ofthe interaction ofthe supply 
of and demand for crime. In analyzing crime rates, researchers like 
Ehrlich (1975), Layson (1985), and Ehrlich and Brower (1987) explicitly 
model crime supply and demand and employ two-stage least squares 
simultaneous equation regression models. However, both Layson (1985) 
and Trun1bull (1989) show that single-equation OLS regression models 
perform as well as the simultaneous equation versions. 
The standard regression equations include the following common 
independent variables asserted to influence crime rates: unemployment, 
income, poverty, population density, race, and police spending. Relevant 
for this paper, Lipford, McCormick, and Tollison (1993) include 
statewide measures ofchurch membership share and church membership 
market concentration. Hull and Bold (1995) use 1980 county data, 
include a more comprehensive Herfindahl index of church membership 
concentration, and add the squared membership share to allow for a non­
linear (diminishing marginal) relationship between church membership 
and crin1e. 
Given that they commit the largest share ofcrimes, the proportion of 
young males in the county population would be an obvious variable to 
include in the regressions. Unfortunately, the available county-level 
demographic data for 1980 and 1990 do not classify residents by the same 
age ranges. Gender ratios are also unavailable by age range. Omitting a 
measure of the proportion of young males is potentially serious, but 
unavoidable. 
Table 1 first generally replicates Hull and Bold's multiple regression 
analysis and shows coefficients from the as yet unexploited 1990 data. 
The number of church adherents by county comes from Churches and 
Church Membership in the U.S., 1980 and 1990 compiled by the 
Glenmary Research Center. 
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TABLE I-Regressions on Crime and Church Adherents 
Dependent Variable Property Crime Violent Crime 
1980 1990 1980 1990 
Constant 3892.7 4626.5 658.4 878.6 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADHERENTS 0/0 -71.6 -40.4 -7.26 -2.68 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) 
ADHERENTS SQUARED 0.405 0.195 0.040 0.012 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 66.2 13.6 2.86 3.42 
(0.000) (0.170) (0.015) (0.047) 
URBAN % 29.6 30.8 2.31 2.98 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
POPULATION DENSITY 0.104 0.359 0.074 0.161 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
WHITE % -11.8 -25.2 -4.77 -7.24 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERSONAL INCOME 0.132 0.017 0.0090 0.0016 
(0.000) (0.115) (0.000) (0.383) 
POLICE SPENDING % 204.4 183.5 20.3 16.5 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
POVERTY % -47.6 -28.1 -0.747 -1.96 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.302) (0.037) 
HERFINDAHL INDEX -0.126 -0.0054 0.013 -0.053 
(0.460) (0.979) (0.551) (0.127) 
N 2926 3023 2926 3023 
-2 
R 0.498 0.470 0.460 0.462 
P-values in parentheses. 
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The Glenmary data report membership in about 110 Judeo-Christian 
denominations in the roughly 3100 counties in the United States. The 
data are compiled from surveys sent to virtually all churches in the United 
States. Results are adjusted to account for differences in defining church 
members and believers and potential problems with incomplete reporting, 
especially for urban African-American churches. Other data are drawn 
from the County and City Data Book (1983, 1988, and 1994 editions). 
The four columns of the table show coefficients for regressions on 
property crime (burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft) and 
violent crime (murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) for 
1980 and 1990. The coefficient on the ADHERENTS% variable shows 
that a 1% increase in the share of county population that are church 
members results in a decrease in property crime ofabout seventy-two per 
100,000 county population in 1980 and forty per 100,000 population in 
1990, holding other factors constant. As background, the mean property 
crime rate was about 2900 per 100,000 county population in 1980. A 1% 
increase in the share ofcounty population that are church members results 
in a decrease in violent crime of seven per 100,000 county population in 
1980 and three per 100,000 county population in 1990. The mean violent 
crime rate was about 230 per 100,000 county population in 1980. 
An ADHERENTS SQUARED variable is included to test whether the 
relationship between church membership and crime is linear. For 
property crime in both 1980 and 1990, the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant, implying that church merrlbership has a negative 
but diminishing marginal effect on crime. The coefficient in the 1980 
violent crime equation is statistically significant but small and for the 
1990 violent crime equation is not statistically significant, suggesting a 
near-linear relationship between violent crime and church membership. 
Coefficients on some of the other independent variables are 
intuitively appealing. For example, the county unemployment rate 
positively affects crin1e rates, although the coefficients are not 
consistently significant. Both the urban population proportion and 
population density are positively related to crime. Crime is lower in 
counties with a larger white population. 
Contrary to intuition, crime rates are positively related to county 
personal income, police spending, and poverty. Although counter to 
intuition, signs on these coefficients are consistent with those reported by 
the aforementioned researchers. Part of the reason for the unexpected 
coefficients is- doubtless due to multicollinearity between poverty, 
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unemployment, and income. For the police expenditures variable at least, 
the sign is a result ofemploying OLS equations in a situation where some 
factors appear in both the demand for and supply of enforcement 
(Hoenack and Weiler, 1980; Levitt, 1997). Further, more crimes are 
reported in areas with more police simply because the additional police 
are able to compile more crime reports. Police spending and personal 
income are also likely interdependent. Additionally, police spending does 
not include private expenditures on security and other protection against 
crime, also likely tied to personal income. Importantly for this paper, 
however, the inverse relationship between church adherence and crime is 
consistent across the time periods and types of crimes. 
Finally, the regressions include the Herfindahl Index, a measure of 
religious market concentration. Coefficients are not statistically 
significant. Apparently denominational concentration or diversity has 
little effect on crinle rates. 
A potential problem with county-level data is that a substantial share 
of U.S. counties have few residents. Median county population is only 
about 21,600 in 1980 and about 22,300 in 1990. With such small 
populations, a single crime can significantly influence the crime rate in 
a given county. This is especially the case for violent crimes, which have 
relatively low rates per 100,000 population. 
An additional problem might arise because the dependent variables 
(crime rates) do not take values below zero and so the regression 
coefficients could be biased. Fortunately, only a small proportion of 
counties have no crime. Less than 1% of counties report no property 
crime in 1980. The same is true in 1990. Less than 4% ofcounties report 
no violent crime in 1980 and about 12% report no violent crime in 1990. 
Limited dependent variable regression models like Tobit are only 
necessary for data with a significant share of zero values for the 
dependent variables (Kmenta, 1986, p. 561). 
Notwithstanding the above, Table 2 reports regression coefficients 
using the sanle equation as before but omitting counties with fewer than 
five thousand residents, roughly 10% ofcounties. This addresses both the 
problem of crime variability in less populous counties and any potential 
concern with limited dependent variables. With regard to the latter, 
virtually none ofthe remaining counties report zero crime rates. As Table 
2 shows, regression coefficients are similar to the previous results, but the 
explanatory value of the equations as measured by the R:2 statistics are 
stronger. 
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TABLE 2-Regressions on Crime and Church Adherents 
County Population 5000 or Greater 
Dependent Variable Property Crime Violent Crime 
1980 1990 1980 1990 
Constant 3076.6 4818.4 564.4 910.2 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADHERENTS 0/0 -60.9 -40.4 -5.84 -1.69 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.093) 
ADHERENTS SQUARED 0.324 0.188 -0.028 0.0047 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.646) 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 82.1 11.9 4.83 3.54 
(0.000) (0.277) (0.000) (0.065) 
URBAN % 31.4 32.6 2.53 3.29 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
POPULATION DENSITY 0.090 0.354 0.070 0.162 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
WHITE % -12.0 -26.2 -4.81 -7.36 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERSONAL INCOME 0.179 0.0076 0.013 -0.0054 
(0.000) (0.570) (0.000) (0.022) 
POLICE SPENDING % 170.2 188.2 17.8 17.8 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
POVERTY % -38.8 -26.3 0.149 -2.21 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.852) (0.044) 
HERFINDAHL INDEX -0.501 -0.193 0.0005 0.098 
(0.004) (0.394) (0.983) (0.014) 
N 2687 2735 2687 2735 
-2 
R 0.534 0.464 0.463 0.462 
P-values in parentheses. 
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In both Table 1 and Table 2 the significance of the coefficient on the 
APHERENTS% variable in the violent crime equation is weaker than in 
the property crime equation. The sociologist Stark (1984) notes the same 
result and argues that people might be more "rational" about property 
crime than violent crin1e and so more responsive to evaluation of 
religious doctrinal costs and benefits in decisions about the former. 
Even in Table 2, a substantial amount of the variation in crime 
remains unexplained by the regression equations. As Glaeser and 
Scheinkman (1996) show, the network-like interaction among criminals 
means that a variety ofequilibrium levels of crime can occur even when 
other characteristics of communities are similar. Because criminals 
respond as groups, otherwise similar communities can have significantly 
different crime rates. 
III. Regressions Using Differenced Variables 
The obvious next step is to calculate new variables that are for each 
county the difference between the 1980 and 1990 values. Some 
observations are lost in this process because of the creation of new 
counties or changes in the way some city-county combinations are 
reported. Table 3 summarizes these regressions. 
Note first in Table 3 that the explanatory values of the equations as 
measured by the R:2 are trivially small. The regression equations explain 
only about 3% of the variations in crime rates. Although not shown, the 
results are not meaningfully improved by removing the least populated 
counties as was done in Table 2. 
,Interestingly, the signs on the ADHERENTS% coefficients are 
positive and statistically significant. Because the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are small and overall explanatory power of the regression 
equations are so weak, these positive coefficients can hardly be regarded 
as refuting the results in Tables 1 and 2. The signs on the other 
coefficients are inconsistent between property and violent crime and not 
often statistically significant. 
In some ways, the weak explanatory power of the differenced 
equations is surprising. County average crime rates fell and average 
church membership increased between 1980 and 1990. The total crime 
rate fell from a county average of 3134 per 100,000 population in 1980 
to 2862 per 100,000 population in 1990. 
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TABLE 3-Regressions on Crime and Church Adherents 
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The average percent of church adherents rose from 55.3 to 59.6 in the 
same period. These aggregate effects are consistent with the regressions 
in Table 1 and Table 2. 
In other ways, the weak results are predictable. For the Glenmary 
data, collection and reporting are not entirely consistent between decades. 
For example, predominately African-American churches are 
underreported in 1980 (Stark, 1987). In 1990, the researchers attempt to 
improve reporting from these churches (Glenmary 1992, Appendix F). 
This issue alone doubtless accounts for some of the increase in overall 
average church membership for the decade and surely affects the 
reliability of the differenced data. In the case of the police expenditures 
variable, the values by county do not change significantly over the 
decade. The largest changes in county police expenditure share are about 
plus or minus 0.05%, a small portion given that the average police 
expenditure share is about 4%. Perhaps most important, a decade might 
well be too short a time period for religion to influence crime rates. Both 
religion and crime are integrally linked to the underlying character of a 
community. Perhaps communities simply tend not to change 
significantly in ten years, or, more precisely, changes within communities 
in ten years are much smaller than differences between communities in 
a given tinle period. The issue bears further investigation. 
IV. Conclusion 
Lipford, McCormick, and Tollison (1993) and Hull and Bold (1995) 
found a significant inverse relationship between church membership and 
crime. Employing more contemporary data, this paper confirms that 
result. U.S. counties with a larger proportion of church members in the 
population have lower crime rates, holding other factors constant. This 
relationship is statistically significant for both 1980 data and 1990 data, 
for a variety of model specifications (some not shown), and for data 
excluding the least populous counties. Church membership share is a 
significant factor in predicting crime rates. 
Ofcourse, the regression analysis cannot prove that religious doctrine 
actually causes individuals to behave properly. The causation might well 
be reversed. Law-abiding citizens might be more religious than 
criminals, so an increase in church membership share necessarily reduces 
the crime rate, simply because fewer criminals are present in that 
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population. Importantly, church membership is also voluntary, 
suggesting that religious affiliation is a signal of individual preference, 
not that religion is an external force compelling good behavior. A 
complete investigation of this possibility might require a 2SLS or 
instrun1ental variables approach, both beyond the scope of this paper. 
On the other hand, religious doctrine does proscribe crime, and crime 
is punished by religions in this life and the afterlife. If the causality is 
reversed and so law-abiding citizens tend to be more religious, what 
purpose would such a proscription serve? Further, although voluntary, 
individuals do not change religious affiliation as readily as they change 
brands of ordinary products. Denominational switching is rare, as is 
religious intermarriage, and most people adopt their parents' religion 
(Iannaccone, 1995). 
At least some research supports a direct causal link between religion 
in a community and crime. Stark (1984) summarizes research showing 
that membership in a religious community affects delinquency while 
individual religious affiliation does not. That is, an individual is less 
likely to commit a crime in a community with a high level of religious 
beliefand participation regardless ofwhether that individual is religious. 
This research suggests that religion affects delinquency through a set of 
group norms or standards and a person is less likely to be delinquent ifhe 
or she has religious friends or is a member of a religious community. 
Thus, church membership might influence an entire community, not just 
the faithful, and religious rules against crime affect both church members 
and nonmen1bers. 
Regardless of whether it simply signals good behavior or whether it 
causes good behavior, church membership is an important but often 
neglected factor in the study of crime. 
Religion still matters. 
Variable Definitions 
VIOLENT CRIME Murder, forcible rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assaults reported to police 
per 100,000 population in the county. 
PROPERTY CRIME Burglary, larceny-theft, and motor 
vehicle thefts reported to police per 
100,000 population in the county. 
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ADHERENTS % Total church adherents per 100 
population in the county. 
ADHERENTS SQUARED ADHERENTS squared. 
HERFINDAHL INDEX Sum of squared market shares of 
denominations. Share ofdenominations 
is calculated as denomination adherents 
divided by total adherents in the county. 
Index equals one thousand for a 
monopoly church. 




POLICE SPENDING % Police expenditures as a percent of total
 
government expenditures in the county. 




POVERTY % Percent of the county population below
 
the poverty level. 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE Unemployment rate in the county. 
URBAN % Percent of the county population living 
in urban areas. 
WHITE % Percent of county population that are 
white (including Hispanic). 
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